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Abstract EU policymakers have created a new European System of Financial Su-
pervision, consisting of three European Supervisory Authorities and a European Sys-
temic Risk Board. This article examines some of the legal and institutional issues,
including the ESAs’ authority to develop an EU code of financial regulation and to
oversee its implementation by Member States and resolve related disputes. The arti-
cle argues that the creation of the ESAs and ESRB is a proportional response to the
increased integration of EU financial markets and the cross-border nature of systemic
risk. The article suggests, however, that the ultimate effectiveness of these supervi-
sory reforms will depend on whether they achieve a balance between crisis preven-
tion supervisory measures and crisis management involving the rescue or resolution
of financial firms. A better balance needs to be struck to achieve financial stability
objectives.
Keywords Regulated Industries and Administrative Law · Financial Institutions
and Services · EU Law · Government Policy and Regulation · Law and Economics:
General
1 Introduction
The growing integration of European financial markets and the financial crisis that
began in 2007 have raised important questions concerning the institutional design of
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European financial supervision.1 Over 50 large financial institutions have significant
cross-border operations in EU states, while wholesale capital markets are increasingly
inter-connected across EU states through electronic exchanges and trading platforms,
clearing houses and the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market. Over the last 10
years, EU financial legislation has grown dramatically in its scope of application to
many areas of market activity.2 The implementation and enforcement of this legisla-
tion has been left ultimately to the discretion and authority of Member State supervi-
sors based on the principle of home country control and mutual recognition. Although
the home country control regime facilitated trade and investment in financial services
across EU states, the adoption of the euro and the institutional consolidation of the
Lamfalussy process led to calls for further consolidation of supervisory practices at
the EU level. Moreover, the recent financial crisis demonstrated major weaknesses in
the EU supervisory framework and the need to have a robust macro-prudential super-
visory regime across the EU that reinforces micro-prudential supervision by Member
States.
To address these weaknesses, the European Commission proposed four Regula-
tions3 in September 2009 that aimed to restructure substantially EU financial super-
vision, thereby creating a new European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS),
consisting of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) to monitor macro-prudential
risks and three EU supervisory authorities (ESAs) whose functions include adopting
a harmonised EU regulatory code and technical guidance standards for implement-
ing EU financial legislation, and overseeing Member States’ supervisory practices.4
The ESA’s main functions involve coordinating the micro-prudential supervision of
Member States and resolving any disputes between Member States or between Mem-
1See Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, chaired by Jacque De Larosière
(Brussels, 25 Feb. 2009) (hereinafter ‘Larosière Report’); Mulbert and Wilhelm [9] and Wymeesrch [13].
2Tridimas [10].
3European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Community macro prudential oversight of the finan-
cial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board COM(2009) 499; European Commission,
Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Banking Authority COM(2009) 501; European Com-
mission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Author-
ity COM(2009) 502; European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Securities
and Markets Authority COM(2009) 503. See also European Commission Press Release, issued 23-9-2009.
4The Regulation creating the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was approved by Council and Par-
liament on 24 November 2010. See Regulation No. 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential over-
sight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, O.J. 2010 L331/1. The
ESRB’s operations became effective on 16 December 2010. See Regulation No. 1093/2010 establishing
a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), O.J. 2010 L331/12; Regulation No.
1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pension
Authority), O.J. 2010 L331/48; Regulation No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority
(European Securities and Markets Authority), O.J. 2010 L331/84. See also Directive 2010/78/EU amend-
ing Directives 98/26/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC,
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority
(European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupa-
tional Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets
Authority), O.J. 2010, L331/120. The three regulations creating the European Supervisory Authorities
were approved by Council and Parliament in December 2010. See also Council Regulation No. 1096/2010
of 17 November 2010 conferring specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the function-
ing of the European Systemic Risk Board, O.J. 2010 L331/162.
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ber States and the ESAs over the implementation and interpretation of EU legisla-
tion, while the ESRB will perform macro-prudential oversight and surveillance of
systemic risk in EU and global financial markets and will have the authority to is-
sue legally non-binding recommendations and warnings to Member States regarding
their supervisory practices. The creation of the ESAs and ESRB builds on the Lam-
falussy 3 Level 3 Committee framework which was essentially based on home coun-
try supervision with limited coordination between Member State supervisors. The
new regime also has important implications for international supervisory and regu-
latory arrangements because the ESAs and the ESRB are likely to play a significant
role in influencing the international regulatory agenda.
The overarching philosophical rationale for designing the European System of
Financial Supervision is to control systemic risk within the internal market and to en-
sure that EU financial legislation is implemented by Member States in a harmonised
way that complies with internal market objectives, such as providing a level playing
field for financial firms and investors operating throughout the EU. The financial cri-
sis demonstrates that systemic risk creates negative externalities in financial markets
which have cross-border effects within the Union and that it is a necessary policy ob-
jective of the EU institutions to control financial risks that can threaten the efficient
operations of the internal market. This article examines some of the legal and insti-
tutional issues regarding the creation of the ESAs and the ESRB and how the cross-
border nature of systemic risk justifies a more consolidated institutional model of EU
financial supervision. The article suggests that the constitutionality of the ESFS must
be understood within the context of the need to establish the EU authorities to moni-
tor and control systemic risk in EU (and globalised) financial markets. In examining
the new regulatory and supervisory framework, the article analyses some of the main
legal and economic policy issues concerning the institutional design of supervision
and whether the new regime provides an adequate institutional and legal framework
for EU financial supervision. The analysis will also address some of the advantages
and disadvantages of other models, including the proposal for a single EU supervisor.
2 The crisis and European financial integration
The causes of the recent crisis have been attributed to macroeconomic factors, major
weaknesses in corporate governance in financial institutions, and serious regulatory
failings.5 The costs of the crisis for EU Member States have been enormous. In the
UK, the cost of the crisis in terms of lost output and lower economic growth has been
estimated at more than 19 per cent of UK GDP.6 It is evident that poorly regulated
financial markets can lead to huge social costs for the broader economy and that these
social costs in regional and globalised markets can be exported to other economies.
Indeed, although there are economic benefits to membership of the EU’s internal
market in terms of greater access to cross-border financial services and capital flows,
5See Alexander et al. [2].
6See House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009), Opinion of proposals for European financial super-
vision. Press release (23-11-2009), p. 116.
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there are also social costs or externalities that arise from excessive financial risk-
taking and weak regulatory and supervisory regimes. For example, the collapse of
the Royal Bank of Scotland and Fortis in 2008 demonstrates how the excessive risk-
taking of a Member State bank can generate cross-border externalities to other EU
countries and financial systems. It is essential therefore that Europe have a more com-
prehensive framework for supervising and controlling the “negative externalities” of
cross-border financial risk-taking. These externalities can be transmitted more easily
throughout EU financial markets because of the greater degree of financial integra-
tion that has resulted in recent years from the liberalisation of the Union’s internal
financial market.7
A vast literature has emerged documenting the growing integration of European
financial markets.8 Following adoption of the euro, there has been significant conver-
gence in interest rate differentials in the wholesale banking and inter-bank markets.
Although retail financial markets remain mostly fragmented, the cost of capital for
equity and debt issuance has experienced a significant degree of convergence across
EU states, while the composition of asset classes in most regulated investment funds
has become less home-biased towards the domestic market. Nevertheless, the impact
of the crisis led to a reversal of cross border bank lending and investment flows.9
The impact of the financial crisis on financial integration, however, has not been
the same throughout the EU. The market segments that had experienced the highest
degree of integration over the last decade were heavily impacted by the crisis, and in
many cases saw a sharp reversal in the integration trend. For example, this was the
case for the unsecured money markets, government bond markets and equity mar-
kets.10 It is not evident, however, whether these recent trends can be interpreted as
a symptom of increasing long-term market segmentation or if they are linked to a
temporary entrenchment by market actors within domestic borders.11
Nevertheless, EU financial markets have evolved to more integrated structures
primarily because of liberalisation of capital restrictions and increased cross-border
trade in banking services. This has been facilitated by the growing importance of the
euro as a reserve currency and advances in technology that enable market participants
to operate more easily in a cross-border environment. The challenge arising from the
increasing integration of European and global financial markets and the recurrence
7See Alexander, Dhumale, Eatwell [1], pp. 120–125.
8European Central Bank, Financial Integration in Europe (April 2010) (Frankfurt: ECB); The European
Commission, Report on EU Financial Integration (2009) (Brussels: Commission).
9European Central Bank, EU Banking Structures (Sept. 2010), pp. 21–22. The ECB noted that post crisis
‘[f]oreign branches lost market share to domestic institutions, and there was a pronounced decline in cross-
border M&As as banks shifted their focus from pursuing growth opportunities to repairing their balance
sheets.’ Ibid. p. 22.
10The European Commission, European Financial Integration Report 2009, Commission Staff Working
Document (Brussels: 11 Dec. 2009), SEC(2009) 1702 final. Although EU states had experienced wider
dispersions in the cost of capital since the crisis, these dispersions vary significantly from state to state.
Ibid, p. 4.
11This interpretation seems to be supported by the reversal of the trend of some indicators (i.e. in the
interbank lending market and in the government bond markets) in the latter part of 2008 and beginning
of 2009. However, further information and time are needed to clearly decode these developments. See
Commission (2009, 17).
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of financial crises, such as the crisis that began in 2007, is how to strike the right in-
stitutional balance between EU institutions and Member States in the regulation and
supervision of financial markets.12
3 EU financial legislation and institutional developments
EC financial services directives have traditionally adopted a functionalist approach
to financial regulation by requiring the same type of activity to be subject to the
same regulatory rules, even though the activity may be performed by different types
of financial institutions (e.g. universal bank or investment bank).13 Moreover, EC
legislation does not require Member States to adopt a particular institutional structure
of financial regulation.14 States may use a single regulator for prudential supervision
(i.e. German Bafin) or divide those responsibilities between two bodies, usually a
central bank for prudential regulation and a capital market regulator for conduct of
business (so-called “twin peaks” approach, as in the Netherlands), or a three-pillar
institutional model (banking, insurance and securities) along sectoral lines. In some
systems, the central bank plays an important role in overall prudential supervision
and in regulating the clearing and settlement system (Italy), while in other countries
a single regulator or supervisor exercises these functions (Sweden).
Financial supervision in the EU was conducted essentially by the Member State
authority where the financial firm was incorporated or had its headquarters. Super-
vision was based on the principle of home country control in which the supervisor
of the jurisdiction where the bank is chartered or incorporated exercised regulatory
responsibility over the bank’s cross-border EU operations.15 However, when an EU-
based banking group had subsidiaries operating in other EU states, the supervision
12The Larosière Report recognises the difference between ‘regulation’ and ‘supervision’ by defining
‘[r]egulation as a set of rules and standards that govern financial institutions’ which ‘can take many dif-
ferent forms’, whereas ‘supervision is the process designed to oversee financial institutions in order to
ensure that rules and standards are properly applied.’ See the High Level Group on Financial Supervi-
sion in the EU’ (chaired by Jacques de Larosière), Report, (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2009). See also Wymeersch
[12], pp. 237–306 (TM Asser Institut) (stating that “regulation” refers essentially to rule-making, while
“supervision” involves applying the rules and judgement to a specific case).
13See First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institu-
tions, O.J. L 322, (17/12/1977), pp. 30–37, Art. 1; Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December
1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and
pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC, O.J. L 386, (30.12.1989),
pp. 1–3, Art. 1 (6).
14However, this has changed somewhat in the securities area, as EU states are now required to establish
a single enforcement authority to enforce the Market Abuse Directive and a single listing authority for all
issuers to file prospectuses under the Prospectus Directive.
15Since the 1980s, EU legislation applied the principle of home country control to the cross-border opera-
tion of banks and other financial institutions, which holds that regulatory authority over banks that conduct
activities through their branches in other member “countries” lies with the competent authorities in the
EU/EEA state where the institution’s head office is incorporated: see Council Directive 89/299/EEC of
the European Parliament and Council of April 17, 1989, OJ 1989 L 124, p. 16; and Council Directive
89/646/EEC of the European Parliament and Council of December 15, 1989 (OJ 1989 L 386, p. 1); Di-
rective 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and Council of March 20, 2000 relating to the taking up
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of those subsidiaries was exercised by the host state supervisor of the jurisdictions
where the subsidiaries were incorporated. The regulatory policy incentives of home
country regulators were primarily to protect depositors and creditors of banks based
in their home jurisdictions. This institutional model worked well as long as bank-
ing activities were largely confined to one country—normally the country where the
bank was incorporated and had its home license.16 It also worked well for banking
groups which had fragmented management structures in which the management of
foreign subsidiaries was largely autonomous from the day-today management of the
parent group, hence allowing the foreign subsidiaries’ management to deal indepen-
dently with host state supervisors. As global financial markets, however, have become
more inter-connected, the structure of banking markets and their management have
changed significantly. Large banking groups have been created from a growing num-
ber of cross-border bank mergers. As a result, many banking groups today have major
operations in multiple jurisdictions where they can pose systemic risk to a host state
banking system.
Moreover, large banks are increasingly dependent on international capital mar-
kets for much of their funding. Banking groups are also progressively centralising a
number of key functions at the group level. For instance, risk management, liquid-
ity management, funding operations and credit control, are typically exercised at the
group level or in specialised affiliates in order to gain economies of scale and syn-
ergies in specialist operations. This also has led to the distinction between branches
and subsidiaries becoming blurred.17
It was argued prior to the 2007 crisis that developments in EU market structures
and firm operations, including risk management, posed serious difficulties for the
EU’s home country supervisory system on the grounds that home country authori-
ties lacked the institutional and legal capacity to oversee adequately the cross-border
risk-taking of EU banking and financial institutions. As a result, EU financial mar-
kets were more exposed to harmful risk taking in other jurisdictions and that finan-
cial crises were more difficult for Member State authorities to control and contain.
Nevertheless, the EU regulatory and supervisory framework of home country control
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ 20000 L 126, p. 1. See also Peter Paul and others v
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Case C-
222/02, 12 October 2004 (recognising that Member State national authorities had a number of supervisory
obligations pursuant to EU law vis-à-vis credit institutions and the exercise of those obligations throughout
the Community based on the principle of home country control).
16But see Caixa-Bank France v Ministere de l’ Economie, des Finances et de l’ Industrie, judgement of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, C-442/02, October 5, 2004 (invalidating a French leg-
islative prohibition on the payment of interest for “sight” accounts for a French subsidiary of a holding
company based in another EU state because it constituted an unnecessary restriction on freedom of estab-
lishment for the holding company, though the French government justified its prohibition on the grounds
of consumer protection and promoting medium and long-term savings). The effective application of the
home country principle based on minimum standards and mutual recognition is premised on the pursuit of
common regulatory objectives and trust between regulatory authorities.
17For instance, it is unlikely that policymakers would allow a large subsidiary bank operating in one
jurisdiction to stay in business if its parent company bank defaults or fails in another jurisdiction (at least
not for the short-run).
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based on mutual recognition and minimum harmonisation of standards accomplished
a great deal in promoting the objectives of the European internal market.18
3.1 The Lamfalussy institutional model
The EU Financial Services Action Plan (1999) and the Lamfalussy Committee Re-
port (2000) recognised how the changing structures of EU financial markets made it
necessary for Europe to have a more harmonised legal and regulatory regime gov-
ern capital markets and the prudential supervision of financial institutions. Indeed,
regarding financial supervision, the Lamfalussy four-level process for devising and
implementing EU financial legislation and regulation was considered an important
institutional step that would allow the EU to achieve greater financial market inte-
gration which would lead to greater economic growth.19 The 3 Level 3 Lamfalussy
committees—the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Com-
mittee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), and the Committee of European
Insurance and Occupational Supervisors (CEIOPS)—were successful prior to the cri-
sis in expediting the regulatory standard-setting process by making it more flexible
and efficient.20 The successful operation of the Level 3 networks depended on co-
operation and frequent contacts between Member State supervisors. Although they
were successful to some extent, it became evident that the changing structure of EU
financial markets necessitated further institutional coordination in the Level 3 com-
mittees to address the growing inter-connectedness of wholesale capital markets and
the cross-border activities of large financial groups.
From a constitutional perspective, it is important to note that the Lamfalussy pro-
gramme did not create a legislative competence in the Level 3 committees to super-
vise financial markets, nor did it enhance the Commission’s legal authority in this
area. Indeed, the original Report of the Committee of Wise Men (the Lamfalussy
18According to minimum harmonisation, Member States are required to harmonise what are considered to
be the essential areas of banking regulation while being free to surpass these essential minimum standards
and to maintain higher distinctive regulatory practices in areas not harmonised so long as they are pursuing
valid public policy objectives and do not unnecessarily infringe on EC Treaty Freedoms.
19The four levels consisted of: (1) legislative proposals of high level principles through the traditional EU
co-decision process; (2) based on the legislative proposals, EU finance ministers agree to implementing
measures for Member States; (3) Member State regulators make proposals to Level 2 Finance Ministers
regarding the implementing measures and then consult with each other regarding implementation; and
(4) national compliance and enforcement (see Lamfalussy Committee, The Final Report of the Committee
of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (Brussels: 15 Feb. 15, 2001). The Lam-
falussy process applied to all major financial sectors, including banking, securities, insurance and pension
fund management.
20The three so-called Lamfalussy Level 3 networks consisted of the Committee of European Securi-
ties Regulators (CESR), the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), and the Commit-
tee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS). Commission Decision
2001/527/EC (6 Jan. 2001) (establishing Committee of European Securities Regulators); Commission De-
cision 2004/5/EC (5 Nov. 2003) (establishing Committee of European Banking Supervisors); and Com-
mission Decision 2004/6EC (establishing Committee of European Insurance and Operational Pensions
Supervisors (CEIOPs)). Initially applying only to the decision-making of EU securities regulators, the
Lamfalussy process was extended in 2004 to the banking, insurance and occupational pension sectors as
well.
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Report) in 2000 envisioned only two principal functions for the Level 3 commit-
tees: (1) technical advice regarding the development of implementing measures, and
(2) promotion of consistent implementation of Community legislation and enhance-
ment of convergence in EU supervisory practices. It was intended essentially to be a
regulatory process that relied on comitology procedures (Arts. 290 and 291 TFEU,
ex-Arts. 202 and 211) to develop EU financial legislation based on proposals from na-
tional finance ministers and regulators, in consultation with industry. The early stages
of implementation of the Lamfalussy programme raised some concerns regarding the
scope of authority of the Commission to adopt binding rules for the Member States
regarding their implementation of EU financial legislation. It became clear however
that the Commission would rely on the Member States acting within the Level 3 com-
mittees to negotiate and coordinate the implementation of EU legislation in a legally
non-binding way which allowed Member States full discretion to adopt regulatory
rules (not prescribed in legislation) and supervisory practices according to national
administrative rules. Nevertheless, Level 3 Committee decision-making played an
important role in setting the regulatory agenda and enhancing cooperation between
Member States, while facilitating a wide ranging dialogue with industry and con-
sumer groups, and disseminating its work and proposals to relevant stakeholders.
The Council and Parliament recognised the early success of the Lamfalussy process
and the ongoing work of the 3 Level 3 committees in coordinating the supervisory
activities of Member State authorities. The Lamfalussy framework was, however, crit-
icised as being too slow and lacking the institutional capacity to respond effectively
to a cross-border financial crisis within the European Union.21
Prior to the crisis, EU authorities had recognised that the growing integration of
wholesale capital markets and the cross-border operations of large banking groups
raised important questions about the effectiveness of the Lamfalussy framework in
performing effective supervision of European financial markets.22 Moreover, the
International Monetary Fund’s surveillance reports identified the weak link in EU
supervisory arrangements to be the absence of a clear framework of coordination
between EU national supervisors with respect to the oversight of the cross-border op-
erations of financial groups in EU states.23 The recognised weaknesses of the Lam-
falussy institutional framework became even more apparent in 2007 and 2008 when
the credit crisis incapacitated wholesale financial markets and the Lehman Brothers
collapse demonstrated the incapacity of EU Member State authorities to manage and
contain a crisis with extensive cross-border effects.
In response, the De Larosière Committee Report concluded that it was necessary to
have more effective cross-border oversight of financial risk-taking and that Member
State authorities lacked the institutional capacity and legal powers to ensure that EU
21Alexander et al. [2], pp. 31–33.
22See CEBS and the European System of Central Bank’s Banking Supervisory Committee (BSC) Joint
Guidance (2006) (extending the guidance role of the Level 3 committees from “going-concern” activities
to crisis management cooperation).
23See IMF article IV Surveillance Report (2007), p. 27, and see also IMF article IV Surveillance Report
(2006) para. 12.
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financial services legislation was being faithfully implemented and that member au-
thorities were exercising adequate prudential supervision.24 Not only should micro-
prudential supervision be reinforced, but it was also necessary for the EU to develop
a more effective macro-prudential oversight system.25 The De Larosière Committee
therefore proposed the creation of a European System of Financial Supervision, con-
sisting of 3 new EU supervisory authorities in the areas of banking, securities and
insurance, respectively, and a European Systemic Risk Committee (the forerunner
to the ESRB). The 3 ESAs would coordinate the supervisory practices of Member
State authorities to ensure effective micro-prudential supervision, while the ESRC
would be responsible for exercising macro-prudential oversight and monitoring sys-
temic risk in the EU financial system. The Committee’s proposals were welcomed
by the Commission and constituted the key elements of the Commission’s proposed
regulations in September 2009 for a European System of Financial Supervision.
The subsidiary and proportionality principles underpin the creation of the ESFS,
which provide that in areas where EU Institutions and member states do not have ex-
clusive competence, the creation of EU supervisory authorities can only be legally
justified on the following grounds: that the objectives of financial regulation and
supervision cannot be satisfactorily met at the national level, and that the creation
of a EU supervisory authority is proportional and necessary to coordinate member
states efforts to control and mitigate systemic risk. Indeed, EU financial markets
are characterised by substantial cross-border externalities. The crisis demonstrated
how the home country control system had come under strain because of the growing
cross-border operations of a large number of EU-based financial institutions and the
growing inter-connections in the wholesale capital markets (e.g. structured finance)
and between small and medium sized firms. Indeed, the credit crisis that began in
2007 demonstrated the cross-border nature of systemic risk in global as well as in
EU financial markets; this was evident through counterparty exposures in the money
markets and disruptions to the cross-border operations of many large banking groups
and financial conglomerates. These changes in EU financial markets had made the
traditional home country control regime and the Lamfalussy framework obsolete in
performing effective supervision over the changing European financial marketplace.
It is submitted therefore that the cross-border nature of systemic risk necessitates the
creation of the ESAs to promote the harmonised implementation of EU financial leg-
islation and regulation, and to ensure that Member States coordinate and harmonise
their supervisory practices.
3.1.1 The need for macro-prudential supervision
A major weakness in most EU Member States’ prudential regulation was that super-
visory practices were focused primarily on individual financial firms and investors,
while not taking into account broader macro-economic factors, such as aggregate lev-
els of risk in the financial system or how risk was being shifted to non-bank firms and
investors in the broader capital markets. Supervisory practices were focused narrowly
24The ‘De Larosière Report’, above n. 12, pp. 26–27.
25Ibid., pp. 39–41, 57.
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on individual firms, while neglecting structural developments in capital markets and
in clearing and settlement systems. For instance, the EU states whose regulatory and
supervisory practices had contributed the most to the propagation of the crisis had
adopted market sensitive regulatory standards which had incorporated the flawed risk
management models used by banks and other financial firms to measure and man-
age risk. These risk management models excessively relied on historic data from the
bank’s balance sheet to measure the risk facing individual institutions, while failing
to take account of macro-level or system-wide shocks that could affect the whole
financial system. Most banks’ risk management models did not take into account
the level of risk that had been shifted to off-balance sheet entities, nor did they in-
corporate the risks related to the growing leverage on banks’ balance sheets. These
regulatory weaknesses were especially acute with the UK Financial Services Author-
ity whose supervisory approach was largely micro-prudential; it focused primarily on
whether or not individual firms themselves were managing their risk appropriately,
and not on the effect of the individual firms’ risk-taking on the financial system as
a whole.26 This regulatory approach however failed to take into account the fallacy
of composition that what appears for individual firms to be rational and prudent ac-
tions in managing their own risk exposures under individual circumstances can, if
followed by all firms, potentially produce imprudent or excessively risky outcomes
for the whole financial system.27
Macro-prudential regulation will change regulation for individual banks in two
main areas: (1) the regulation of individual firms must take into account both firm
level practices and broader macro-economic developments in determining how regu-
latory requirements will be applied to firm risk-taking (i.e. linking the growth of asset
prices and GDP with contra-cyclical bank reserves and liquidity ratios), and (2) lim-
itations on the type of financial products and investments offered because of controls
on the overall levels of risk-taking and leverage at the level of the financial system (i.e.
limits on loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios). Implementing macro-prudential
regulation will require that micro-prudential regulation become more rules-based be-
cause tighter ex ante constraints will be needed for the risk exposures of individual
firms (i.e. leverage ratios and limits on maturity mismatches in wholesale funding).28
Prudential regulation will gradually become more rules-based in order to achieve
macro-prudential objectives. Macro-prudential regulation will change the nature of
prudential regulation because the supervisory focus will be expanded to include the
26The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (March 2009, London, The Finan-
cial Services Authority). In the case of the UK, excessive reliance on principles-based regulation (PBR)
also exacerbated weaknesses in the UK supervisory framework. The PBR approach focused on incen-
tivising individual firm to experiment with different risk management practices so long as they achieved
satisfactory firm outcomes that were measured by firm performance (i.e. shareholder prices) and whether
the FSA’s 11 high level principles were being achieved (i.e. treating customers fairly). The FSA’s PBR
approach did not take into account the aggregate effect of firms’ performance on the financial system in
terms of leverage generated and liquidity risks from wholesale funding exposures. To address adequately
these macro-prudential risks in the future, prudential regulation will necessarily become more rules-based
at the level of the firm and at the level of the financial system.
27See Brunnemeier [5], pp. 17–20 (discussing fallacy of composition).
28See discussion in House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (June 2009) “Banking Super-
vision and Regulation,” Volumes 1 & 2 (London: House of Lords).
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application of macro-prudential controls to the broader financial system. Naturally,
this will create new incentives for market participants to avoid the requirements by
adopting new financial instruments and structures which may lead to new regulatory
risks. Supervisors and central banks should be vigilant therefore as to how the market
may respond to new macro-prudential controls.
The new focus on macro-prudential supervision will require supervisors to en-
gage in surveillance of the financial system by monitoring aggregate leverage in the
markets, the inter-connectedness between firms (large and small) in wholesale fund-
ing markets, and the impact of monetary policy on financial markets. Supervisors
will also have to take into account macro-prudential factors in deciding how to apply
micro-prudential controls on individual firms. Any consideration of a future model of
EU supervision must take into account the links between micro-prudential regulation
of individual firms and macro-prudential oversight of the financial system.
4 The European system of financial supervision
The creation of the European System of Financial Supervision consisting of the ESAs
and the ESRB provides significant institutional consolidation of financial supervision
at the EU level in order to conduct more effectively macro-prudential oversight and
micro-prudential supervision and regulation. In doing so, EU policymakers have de-
cided to accept in principle the institutional framework proposed by the Larosière
Committee to consolidate supervision along the lines of the pre-existing 3 Level 3
committees of the Lamfalussy framework. The newly created ESAs have legal per-
sonality and competence to adopt a harmonised regulatory rulebook and technical
Table 1 European System of Financial Supervision
240 K. Alexander
guidance standards for Member State supervisors and the authority to ensure consis-
tent application of EU financial legislation and regulatory rules. The creation of the
ESRB aims to complement the work of the ESAs by enhancing EU Member States’
capacity to assess and monitor systemic risks and perform macro-prudential oversight
of European and global financial markets. Examples of macro-prudential oversight
would include obtaining data from supervisors on large systemically important finan-
cial institutions and on the transmission of risk in interconnected wholesale financial
markets.
4.1 European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
The ESRB consists of a General Board, a Steering Committee, a Secretariat, an Ad-
visory Technical Committee, and an Advisory Scientific Committee.29
The ESRB was established to be the main body responsible for macro-prudential
oversight and surveillance of EU financial markets. ESRB Regulation, Article 3 (1)
states:
“The ESRB shall be responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the finan-
cial system within the Community in order to prevent or mitigate systemic risks
within the financial system, so as to avoid episodes of widespread financial dis-
tress, contribute to a smooth functioning of the Internal Market and ensure a
sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth.”
Despite its lack of formal institutional structure, it has a broad remit to exercise a
number of important functions in the field of macro-prudential oversight, including
monitoring sources of systemic risk and other risks to financial stability across EU
countries and financial sectors and serving as an institutional voice for EU central
bankers in shaping and developing macro-prudential supervisory practices. It also
will interact with global financial stability bodies to develop effective early warning
systems. The ESRB will aim to identify and prioritise the risks and use stress testing
and other methodologies to analyse how they can impact financial stability.
The ESRB became operational on 16 December 2010 and consists of 65 represen-
tatives and officials consisting of the EU central bank governors, representatives of
the European Supervisory Authorites, the Economic and Finance Committee, and the
European Commission, all serving on a General Board. The first chairperson of the
ESRB is the ECB President who will hold office for a five year term.30 The ESRB
will have two Vice Chairs: the first Vice Chair will be elected by and from the ESRB
board members who are also members of the ECB General Council (i.e. eurozone
central bank governors), while the second Vice Chair is the Chair of the Joint Com-
mittee of the ESAs.31 The legal basis of the Regulation is Article 114 TFEU.32 The
29ESRB Regulation, Art. 4. For a more detailed discussion of the ESRB institutional structure, see Ferran
and Alexander [7].
30ESRB Regulation, Art. 5(1).
31ESRB Regulation, Art. 5(3).
32Art. 114 TFEU, OJ C 115/47 (9/5/2008), ex Art. 95 TEC, which allows ‘measures for the approximation
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market’.
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ESRB monitors and assess systemic risks arising from individual banks and across
the whole European financial system. In doing so, it seeks to draw connections be-
tween macroeconomic conditions and structural developments in financial markets,
and identify vulnerabilities with particular institutions.
The ESRB would also issue recommendations and warnings to countries or finan-
cial groups or other concerned entities and would report all recommendations and
warnings to the Council of Ministers and to the European Parliament. The ESRB
would devise specific follow-up procedures and “moral incentives” to follow its rec-
ommendations and if supervisors decide not to follow the recommendations they are
obliged to explain why not. The ESRB can inform the Council if unsatisfied with a
Member State or entity’s explanation and can conduct “name and shame” publicity
if necessary. The ESRB will be assisted by a steering committee that will assist it
in decision-making, reviewing and preparing for meetings of the General Board, and
monitoring the ESRB’s work progress. The steering committee membership will be
the Chair and First Vice-Chair of the ESRB, and four other members of the ESRB
General Board elected for three year terms by and from the General Board’s mem-
bers who are also members of the ECB General Council (i.e. eurozone central bank
governors).33
The Regulation confers a specific role for the European Central Bank in the
ESRB’s operation: the ECB provides the secretariat for the ESRB while perform-
ing administrative, logistical and analytical support. This would also include drawing
on technical advice from the 27 EU national central banks and supervisors.34 How-
ever, the ECB’s integral role in providing administrative support, and overseeing and
discharging the operations of the ESRB, is constrained by Article 127 (6) TFEU that
requires a unanimous vote by the Council to allow the ECB to carry out any function
for the ESRB that directly involves the prudential supervision of financial institutions.
So the extent and scope of the ECB’s Secretariat role may be limited to functions not
involving micro-prudential supervision of individual financial institutions, but per-
mitting macro-prudential oversight.
The ESRB is expected to provide a broader perspective of the financial system
and to interact with supervisors in monitoring and assessing system-wide risks. In
this capacity, the ESRB would serve as the basis for developing a more integrated EU
supervisory structure that would improve consistency in regulatory and supervisory
practices and approaches across EU/EEA states, thus creating a level playing field
and a more efficient regulatory framework for controlling cross-border systemic risk
and preventing market failure.
The capacity of the ESRB to perform its function of identifying and monitoring
systemic risk has been called into question because there is inadequate understand-
ing of the causes of systemic risk and that the proposed ESRB Regulation does not
33The steering committee also includes a European Commission member, the Chairs of each of the ESAs,
the President of the Economic and Finance Committee, the Chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee,
and the Chair of the Advisory Technical Committee. See ESRB Regulation, Art. 11.
34See speech of Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, January 22
(2010), p. 4.
242 K. Alexander
provide any information on what systemic risk means and how to measure it.35 More-
over, the design of the ESRB has been criticised as being flawed. In addressing this
concern, it is submitted that although systemic risk is difficult to measure, and its
causes are even more difficult to identify precisely (especially for a future financial
crisis), EU policymakers should not conclude therefore that they should not try to
establish institutional frameworks to monitor systemic risks across EU financial mar-
kets. Indeed, the financial crisis demonstrates that macro-prudential risks are evident
in the European financial system.36 For example, banks have exposure to each other
throughout Europe in the money markets through a variety of risk exposures, and Eu-
ropean policymaking needs to have better surveillance of the cross-sectoral systemic
risks posed by certain banking groups and financial conglomerates that operate in
Europe.
The crisis also demonstrates that systemic risk arises in the wholesale capital
markets—especially through the securitisation and the over-the-counter credit de-
fault swap markets—as well as from individual financial institutions. The Turner
Review recognised that the sources of systemic risk can be macro-prudential in na-
ture and that this necessitates that central banks and regulators establish enhanced
cross-border (international and European) frameworks for identifying and monitor-
ing macro-prudential systemic risks and, in certain circumstances, for issuing early
warnings to affected countries. The absence of a consensus view on the sources of
systemic risk therefore does not preclude the design of effective cross-border in-
stitutional structures to monitor and measure systemic risks in European financial
markets.
Other critics raised the concern that the composition of the ESRB was too heav-
ily weighted in favour of central bankers and observed that a ESRB dominated by
EU central bankers should not be given such an important role because over the last
decade “the ECB, the Eurosystem NCBs, and the rest of the national NCBs [had]
not exactly covered themselves with glory in the area of macro-prudential supervi-
sion and regulation.”37 Also, because all decisions to bail out a bank or provide other
crisis assistance requires approval of national fiscal authorities, it has been argued
that EU Finance Ministries should also be represented on the ESRB. Nevertheless,
the ESRB’s absence of legal personality provides it with more institutional flexibility
and scope to fulfil its core functions and a broad mandate to monitor the whole Euro-
pean financial system. It also allows the ESRB to interact flexibly with the ESAs and
Member State supervisors to form a common framework of regulation that allows for
regulatory innovation to address evolving market risks.
35See oral evidence of Jon Danielsson, The Committee’s Opinion on proposals for European financial
supervision, House of Commons Treasury Committee (Sixteenth Report of session 2008-09), Ev 1.
36Alexander et al. [2], pp. 2–3, 17–18.
37See “The Committee’s Opinion on proposals for European financial supervision”, House of Commons
Treasury Committee (Sixteenth Report of session 2008-09), p. 18 (citing the written evidence by Willem
Buiter). Indeed, the ECB Financial Stability Review stated in June 2007 just before the credit crisis that
‘[w]ith the Euro area financial system in a generally healthy condition and the economic outlook remaining
favourable, the most likely prospect is that financial system stability will be maintained in the period
ahead.’ ECB Financial Stability Review [6], p. 9.
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4.2 The European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)
The ESFS would consist of a network of Member State supervisors that would op-
erate within three different ESAs with responsibility for banking, insurance and se-
curities markets, respectively.38 Each Member State supervisor would continue to
be responsible for discharging its supervisory functions, but under the ESA regula-
tions it would have to account for its supervisory practices to the relevant ESA. Each
ESA will be responsible for adopting a harmonised rule-book, technical standards
and guidance for the application and implementation of EU financial legislation. As
discussed below, their most important immediate responsibility would be to formalise
the operations of the colleges of supervisors which presently oversee the cross-border
operations of Europe’s largest 50 or so banks and financial institutions. The deci-
sion to build the ESFS along sectoral lines—banking, securities and insurance—was
influenced significantly by the existing sectoral approach of the Lamfalussy frame-
work. EU policy makers could have diverged away from the Lamfalussy sectoral
approach by proposing instead to create a single EU financial supervisor for all finan-
cial services, or alternatively a single EU supervisor for each of the three financial
sectors. Rather, the Commission chose to build directly on the existing framework by
transforming the 3 Level 3 supervisory committees into more formalised institutional
structures with legal personality and the power to resolve disputes between supervi-
sors and to issue Directives enjoining supervisors to bring their practices into com-
pliance with EU law and regulatory codes. This path-dependent approach recognised
that the transaction costs—both institutional and political—would have been much
higher if EU policymakers had proposed a more dramatic institutional shift away
from the Lamfalussy framework. Also, equally important, the use of the Lamfalussy
institutions on which to build the ESFS recognised that a new formalised EU insti-
tutional structure was nevertheless to be firmly and primarily anchored in Member
State competence to supervise financial markets. The ESFS/ESA framework builds
on the existing decentralised Member State supervisory approach by enhancing the
ability of supervisors to coordinate cross-border oversight along with enhanced ac-
countability to other Member States to ensure faithful implementation of EU law.
Moreover, the ESA institutional framework recognises the interdependence be-
tween micro- and macro-prudential risks across EU financial markets and the need to
be accountable to the views of market participants and all EU stakeholders, including
financial institutions, investors and consumers. It provides a more consolidated and
rational institutional design for linking micro-prudential supervision of individual
firms with the supervision of the linkages between institutions and between institu-
tions and the broader financial system.
4.3 The ESFS and colleges of supervisors
The ESFS would place greater emphasis on using colleges of supervisors from EEA
states to supervise the operations of Europe’s largest cross-border banks and finan-
cial institutions. The European Banking Authority has responsibility for overseeing
38Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council COM(2009) 503 (establishing a European
Securities and Markets Authority), COM(2009) 502 (establishing a European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority), and COM(2009) 501 (establishing a European Banking Authority).
244 K. Alexander
the implementation of guidelines and decision-making procedures for the colleges.
Membership of the colleges would include: All EEA supervisors of subsidiaries;
EEA supervisors of branches recognised as significant; third country supervisors with
equivalent confidentiality provisions; and central banks as appropriate. Moreover, the
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) (Art 131a) provides the legal basis for a sin-
gle college for global EEA-based banks. The main function of colleges will be to
exchange information between supervisors, coordinate communication between su-
pervisors of the financial group, voluntary sharing and/or delegation of tasks, joint
decision on model validation (e.g. Basel II). The colleges will also be involved in
joint risk assessment and joint decision on the adequacy of risk-based capital require-
ments. The planning and coordination of supervisory activities for the financial group
and in preparation of and during emergency situations (i.e. crisis management). The
ESAs will have oversight of the colleges and will have authority through conciliation
and mediation to resolve disputes between member authorities in the colleges. Some
concern has been expressed that this power of conciliation and mediation might in-
fringe Member State fiscal autonomy, but the better view holds that these concerns
are exaggerated as the ESAs will only be able to resolve disputes and devise rules
and technical standards for national supervisors based on the requirements of EU
financial legislation.
4.4 The fiscal autonomy of Member States
The Regulations establishing the ESFS provide no authority for EU institutions to
order Member States to spend taxpayer funds in a crisis (i.e. bail out a bank). Indeed,
ESA Regulations do not provide a crisis management mechanism that would require
a member authority to use public funds in a crisis. In other words, the sovereignty
of Member States with respect to their fiscal prerogative to support ailing financial
institutions has not been intruded upon. In fact, the fiscal safeguards provision of
article 38 of the EBA Regulation does not permit the EBA to take any measures under
articles 18 or 19 that would require a Member State to make fiscal expenditures. The
fiscal safeguards provision applies to the authority of the ESAs to resolve disputes
between member supervisors under article 19.
Some Member State Parliaments, however, have expressed concern that the fiscal
safeguard provisions of article 38 only apply to orders issued by an ESA under articles
18 and 19, and that an ESA could potentially order a member authority under some
other article of the Regulations to take action that might involve fiscal expenditure.39
This possibility was pointed out with respect to the original draft article 21 of the
EBA Regulation which authorised the ESAs to order a member authority to comply
with a recommendation or warning issued by the ESRB. Council addressed these
concerns by amending the ESA regulations with article 36 to make it clear that no
ESRB recommendation or warning could be made legally binding by the ESA on a
member state authority.
39House of Commons Treasury Committee, “The Committee’s Opinion on proposals for European finan-
cial supervision”, House of Commons Treasury Committee (Sixteenth Report of session 2008-09, London:
House of Commons).
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4.5 Delegation of regulatory powers to the ESAs and ESRB
Another area of possible legal challenge concerns the Commission’s use of Article
114 (ex art 95) of the Treaty as the legal basis to adopt the regulations creating the
ESAs and the ESRB. Article 114 (ex art 95) authorises EU institutions to create EU
agencies and other EU bodies with delegated powers to facilitate the harmonised im-
plementation of EU law.40 The ECJ has interpreted Article 114 to require that the
legislation creating such bodies demonstrate that it is actually and objectively appar-
ent from the legal act creating the body that its purpose is to improve the conditions
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market.41 Moreover, the ECJ
has observed that the responsibilities delegated to such a body be closely linked to
the subject matter of the relevant harmonising legislation.42 However, the scope of
authority to be delegated under Article 114 to EU agencies/bodies is limited by the
so-called Meroni doctrine that holds that EU agencies cannot be delegated ultra vires
powers (that is, powers that are not already conferred by Treaty on EU institutions)
to implement EU law.43 Moreover, ECJ jurisprudence also prohibits EU institutions
from delegating intra vires powers to EU agencies or bodies if such powers delegate
substantial discretion to EU agencies to make decisions that essentially involve poli-
cymaking; for example, decisions involving the allocation of economic resources be-
tween competing interests. Such discretionary policymaking can only be taken by EU
institutions based on their conferred Treaty-based powers. EU agencies and bodies
are therefore limited to drafting and proposing regulatory rules and technical stan-
dards that do not imply strategic decisions or policy choices and whose content is
limited by the EU legislation on which they are based.
The ESAs are authorised to perform what are essentially agency functions under
EU law, that is, to make decisions involving the drafting of regulatory technical stan-
dards, adopting non-binding recommendations and guidelines, and facilitating mem-
ber authorities’ implementation of a common EU regulatory code which is approved
40The EU institutions (Parliament and Council) are permitted to use Article 114 as the legal basis for
establishing EU bodies that are vested with responsibilities for contributing to the harmonisation process
and facilitating uniform implementation of EU legislation by Member States. United Kingdom v European
Parliament (Smoker Flavourings) (C-66/04) [2005] E.C.R. I-10553; [2006] 3 C.M.L.R. 1. See also, United
Kingdom v European Parliament (ENISA) (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771; 3 C.M.L.R. 2.
ENISA (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771 at [45] (stating ‘where the Community body thus established
provides services to national bodies and/or operators which affect the homogenous implementation of
harmonising instruments which are likely to facilitate their application’).
41Smoke Flavourings (C-66/04) [2005] E.C.R. I-10553 at [45] (stating “the expression ‘measures for the
approximation’ in Article 95 EC” [art 114 TFEU] ‘was intended to confer on the Community legislature
a discretion, depending on the general context and specific circumstances of the matter to be harmonised,
as regards the harmonisation technique most appropriate for achieving the desired result, in particular in
fields which are characterised by complex technical features.’ See also ENISA (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R.
I-3771 at [43]. See discussion in Borchadt and Wellens [4], pp. 297–298.
42ENISA (C-217/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-3771 at [45] (stating ‘that the tasks conferred on such a body must
be closely linked to the subject matter of the acts approximating the law, regulations and administrative
provisions of the Member States’).
43Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SPA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, (C-9/56) [1958] E.C.R. I-00133.
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by Commission, Parliament and Council.44 Under the Regulations, the Commission
has a delegated power to review and approve ESA proposed draft regulatory techni-
cal standards (Article 10(1)) and implementing technical standards (Article 15 (1)).
The regulatory technical standards and implementing technical standards constitute,
in part, a harmonised rulebook to ensure consistency of supervisory practice amongst
Member States, and to mediate and resolve disputes between Member States and
between Member States and the ESAs. The ESAs exercise considerable influence be-
cause of the financial market expertise of their staff, stakeholder groups, and supervi-
sory representatives of member states. Moreover, they exercise considerable discre-
tionary authority to develop legally nonbinding guidelines and recommendations (Ar-
ticle 8 (1)(a)) that contribute to the content of regulatory and supervisory standards,
and they can impose orders with Commission approval on member state authorities
or financial institutions requiring them to comply with EU financial legislation listed
in Article 1(2).
As mentioned above, the ESAs and the ESRB were established by Regulation un-
der Article 114 TFEU. The ESAs were established as bodies with legal personality
and possessing delegated binding powers, whilst the ESRB was established as a body
without legal personality and no direct legally binding powers.45 Despite these dif-
ferences, it is submitted that the delegation of powers issues that are raised under
Article 114 TFEU are very similar for these bodies and the same general EU insti-
tutional issues are raised by the exercise of their functions. Any challenge on Treaty
grounds, however, against the ESFS and ESAs will have difficulty prevailing for the
important reason that the newly-established EU supervisory framework remains es-
sentially decentralised in its operations because it relies primarily on the exercise of
financial supervision by Member State authorities in areas of micro-prudential and
macro-prudential supervision, despite the obligation of member authorities to coor-
dinate their supervisory practices with each other and to provide supervisory infor-
mation to the EU central banks through the ESRB. It is submitted therefore that the
Regulations establishing the ESFS, ESAs and the ESRB would likely withstand con-
stitutional challenge because they maintain the essential decentralised supervisory
structure with Member States exercising ultimate competence to supervise financial
markets while building lines of accountability to other EU states through the Euro-
pean supervisory agencies.
The ESAs and the ESRB were established by Regulation under article 114 TFEU.
The ESAs were established as bodies with legal personality with binding power to is-
sue decisions that are approved by the Commission, while the ESRB was established
as a body without legal personality and with no binding powers.46 The ESRB Reg-
ulation emphasises the advantages of flexibility that flow from the absence of legal
personality.47 It suggests that this will allow the ESRB, together with the ESFS, to
“form a common innovative framework for financial supervision, while maintaining a
44European Commission, European Agencies—the Way Forward COM(2008) 135.
45COM(2009) 499. Indeed, the ESRB Regulation emphasises the advantages of flexibility that flow from
the absence of legal personality. Ibid, explanatory memorandum, para. 4.
46COM(2009) 499.
47Ibid, explanatory memorandum, para 4.
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clear distinction of responsibilities between [itself] (. . . ) and the other bodies.”48 The
Commission also links the ESRB’s lack of legal personality to the “wide scope and
the sensitivity of its missions.”49 It appears, however, that this policy choice was also
influenced by more pragmatic considerations because of certain technical difficulties
pertaining to the ECB’s capacity to provide services to another legally-constituted
body.50
Some commentators argue that the lack of legal personality and binding powers
need not necessarily be an impediment to the ESRB establishing authority and influ-
ence in relation to the financial markets. It may be compared in this respect to the
Financial Stability Board, which is also a body without legal personality.51 It is the
quality of what the ESRB does rather than its organisational form that will determine
its external impact.52 The ESRB’s lack of legal personality, however, could hamper
the ESRB in maintaining an appropriate distance from the ECB.53 However, the ECB
while exercising its administrative support function will also probably be concerned
to ensure a proper demarcation so that its role in relation to the ESRB does not inter-
fere with the performance of its monetary policy and price stability tasks.
Regarding the ESAs, the preamble of their Regulations state that their objective
is to “contribute directly to achieving the objectives of the internal market.”54 Yet
mere assertion of an internal market role does not guarantee that the legislative mea-
sures in question (in this case, the Regulations creating the ESAs) are intra vires.
In determining whether the ESA regulations comply with the Treaty’s delegation of
powers principles, it is thus necessary to examine the ESA’s mission and the specific
tasks conferred on it. Essentially, the ESAs would provide a point of contact for na-
tional supervisors to interact and coordinate their oversight of cross-border financial
firms and address matters of mutual concern between Member State supervisors and
the ESAs. Moreover, the ESAs would perform specifically delegated tasks, such as
mediating disputes between supervisors and, if necessary, resolving disputes.
It is important to observe that these tasks would not involve the delegation of
discretionary powers that would require a margin of political judgement. The EU in-
stitutions cannot delegate powers to EU agencies to make generally binding rules, but
rather can only delegate limited powers to make decisions on narrow technical mat-
ters.55 The alleged inflexibility of EU law with respect to delegation is questioned
in the academic literature but this interpretation has been accepted by the Commis-
sion. The Commission also takes the view that there are further restrictions on the
decision-making agencies’ scope for action and will authorise them to intervene only
48Ibid.
49Ibid, para 6.
50C Zilioli, ‘The EU September Package of Reform: A View from the EU Institutions’ (conference pre-
sentation, London, 11 December 2009).
51See Declaration of London (2 April 2009), para 8 (reconstituting the Financial Stability Forum into the
Financial Stability Board as a soft law international body).
52COM(2009) 499, para 6.1.
53Ferran, Alexander [7].
54EC Regulation preamble, nineteenth recital.
55See generally Lenaerts [8].
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in areas where a single public interest predominates and in areas where the agencies
are not called upon to arbitrate on conflicting public interests, exercise any powers of
political appraisal or conduct any complex economic assessments.56
5 Some related considerations
5.1 What role for a single EU supervisor?
There remains an important objection to the Regulations creating the ESFS and ESRB
on public policy grounds that they do not go far enough.57 In the aftermath of the cri-
sis, there have been proposals to establish a single EU supervisor for the largest 50
or so financial institutions with cross-border operations throughout Europe.58 Their
significant regional, and indeed global, scope makes them amenable to a transna-
tional supervisory structure that is consolidated at the European level in the form
of a single EU prudential supervisor that would have full competence to supervise
these firms and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. The main argument for in-
stitutional consolidation at the EU level is that Europe’s growing internal financial
market is much more integrated—both at the level of the financial system and at
the level of firms operating cross-border—which cannot be supervised efficiently by
Member States acting independently because of different institutional capacities and
supervisory practices. It is argued that a centralised EU supervisory body would have
a number of advantages that include promoting a level playing field in supervisory
practices, coordinating and overseeing the activities of Member State authorities, and
conducting cross-border surveillance and enforcement.59 Similarly, a single EU su-
pervisor could also play an important role in supervising the growing inter-connected
infrastructure of EU capital markets, in particular the clearing houses and certain
settlements systems that operate at EU level. An important rationale for this is that
national supervisors have high transactions costs in supervising the cross-border di-
mension of financial markets and a single EU supervisor can reduce these transaction
costs by coordinating the activities of member authorities. The rationale for this is
not only that it would be extremely difficult for national supervisors to obtain a clear
picture of these institutions and their operations, but even more because their poten-
tially risky operations may create significant cross-border externalities, which makes
supervising them solely by one national supervisor suffer from a serious incentive
56See European Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies
COM(2002) 718 9.
57European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (November 2009) “A new Life for European Finan-
cial Supervision,” Statement No. 31 (Stockholm).
58Considerable support has emerged for a single EU financial supervisor across all financial sectors or a
single supervisor along the lines of each of the main financial services sectors—banking, securities and
insurance. See Andenas, Avgerinos [3] (suggesting a single EU banking regulator as an ideal model in light
of the crisis).
59The creation of an EU supervisor could potentially reduce the high transaction costs of monitoring and
enforcing EU law on a cross-border basis. Further, a single supervisor could assist with resources and
training for some member authorities in need of assistance.
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problem. Further consolidation of EU supervision, however, would not be permitted
by the Treaty. The Treaty for European Union crystallises this institutional limita-
tion. But some argue that politicians should address this absence of Treaty authority
for creating a single EU supervisor by amending the Treaty to allow this to be done
(ESFRC 2009).
Although there are recognised benefits to such a centralised institutional struc-
ture, there are some concerns regarding the sovereignty costs that states would in-
cur by allowing such an authority to have jurisdiction to monitor and enforce EU
law in their jurisdictions. An extensive literature has emerged questioning the utility
and effectiveness of the single supervisory model for Europe.60 Moreover, on con-
stitutional grounds, there are critics who assert that the Commission and EU bodies
do not have a conferred power to engage in prudential supervision or even macro-
prudential surveillance.61 According to this view, the Meroni doctrine62 would pro-
hibit the Commission and Council from creating an EU agency and then delegating
powers to the agency to supervise EU financial markets on the grounds that pruden-
tial supervision has not been conferred by the Treaty on EU institutions and therefore
cannot be delegated to a newly created EU supervisor.
Based on these objections, it was more legally realistic for the Commission to have
set forth proposals on supervisory consolidation that approximate those proposed by
the Larosière Committee. Indeed, the Commission’s proposals were welcomed in
many quarters precisely because any further institutional consolidation beyond that
proposed by the Larosisere Committee would have been on weaker constitutional
grounds insofar as article 114 TFEU was serving as the legal basis for creating EU
supervisory authorities who are deemed necessary to promote the harmonised imple-
mentation of EU financial legislation.
5.2 What about supervisory oversight for the ESCB/ECB?
Other advocates of more centralised EU supervision suggest that the European Cen-
tral Bank or the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has a role to play in per-
forming macro-prudential oversight and supervision.63 As a general matter, the ECB
is responsible for overseeing the smooth operation of the eurozone payment system,
but it is legally prohibited under Article 127 (6) TFEU from engaging in prudential
supervision of individual financial institutions unless it obtains unanimous consent
from EU states.64 Macro-prudential supervision, however, involves oversight and the
assessment of risks across the financial system, and not simply prudential supervision
60Vives [11], pp. 57–82.
61See House of Commons Treasury Committee Final Report (23 Nov. 2009).
62Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority [1957–1958] ECR 133.
63Gonzalez-Paramo, Jose Manuel (January 22, 2010), Speech, Presentation of the Report, Member of the
Executive Board of the ECB (Madrid).
64The ECB’s main tasks involve macro-prudential oversight including the oversight of the payment and
settlement system, price stability assessments and monetary policy. In performing these functions, how-
ever, the ECB is prohibited expressly from engaging directly in prudential supervision under Article
127 (6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Nevertheless it has responsi-
bility to “contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the
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of individual financial institutions. Moreover, a strong argument can be made that the
ECB and/or the ESCB should be allowed to conduct oversight of clearing and settle-
ment systems (including the operations of central counterparties operating in the EU)
because of the language provided in the fourth indent of Article 127 (2) TFEU and
Articles 3.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the Euro-
pean Central Bank that provides in relevant part that ‘[t]he ECB and national central
banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations, to ensure the effi-
cient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Community and with other
countries.’65 Further, Article 22 of the ESCB Statute provides additional authority for
the ECB to adopt regulations to ensure the efficiency and soundness of EU clearing,
settlement and payment systems within the Union and between the Union and other
countries.66
The ESCB/ECB’s treaty powers in this area may clash with the Commission’s
proposed Regulation on Market Infrastructure (EMIR) that would provide sole au-
thority to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to supervise the
EU clearing and settlement system, including supervision of clearing houses, deriva-
tives and other financial instruments subject to a clearing requirement.67 In response,
the ECB argued in a legal opinion in January 2011 that the ESCB’s responsibility for
the smooth operation of payment systems and ‘to implement the monetary policy of
the Union’ in Article 127 (2) indent 1 (also provided in Article 3.3 of the Statute of
the ESCB) depends on its ability to promote the smooth operation of clearing and set-
tlement systems and infrastructures and therefore is a basic task of the Eurosystem.68
Accordingly, the ECB argues that EMIR should be amended to recognise expressly
the ESCB’s role in overseeing EU clearing systems and that it should be made clear
that it has joint authority with ESMA to provide oversight and supervision in this
area.69
prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system” (Art 127 (5) TFEU).
How might the ECB “contribute to the smooth conduct of policies” in the Eurosystem and throughout the
EU without having access to supervisory information? An examination of the EU legal framework appli-
cable to the exchange of information between central banks and supervisory authorities suggests that the
EU regime is “asymmetric” because although the ECB and European System of Central Banks are obliged
to contribute to the smooth functioning of supervisory policies, supervisory authorities do not have an
equivalent responsibility to contribute to the tasks of the ECB or ESCB. Until this asymmetry is rectified,
the EU will fail to have effective macro-prudential supervision. One of the tasks of the ESRB is to facil-
itate a balance flow of information between supervisors and central banks in order to establish effective
macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial system.
65Art 127 (2) (TFEU)—fourth indent. The ECB adopted an opinion on 13 January 2011 that the Com-
mission proposed Regulation on Market Infrastructure (EMIR) should be amended so that the European
system of Central Banks would be given oversight responsibility for the operation of EU central counter-
parties and any third party central counterparty operating in EU markets. The legal authority cited for this
proposal was Article 127 (6) that provides that one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB
is the promotion of the smooth operation of the payment system.
66Article 22 of the ESCB Statute. See discussion in Alexander et al. (2006), p. 122 and p. 282.
67See Commission proposal for a Regulation on Market Infrastructure (22 Sept. 2010).
68See ECB Opinion of 13 January 2011 (Con/2011/1) p. 2.
69The ECB also observes national central banks whose currency is not the euro would also have similar
powers to oversee clearing and related infrastructure as the ECB would have in acting through the National
Central Banks of the Eurosystem.
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On the other hand, the ESCB’s oversight authority over clearing may lead cen-
tral banks and in particular the ECB operating through the Eurosystem to engage
in supervisory oversight of individual CCPs, which are in many EU states autho-
rised credit institutions, which are prohibited from being subject to direct ‘prudential
supervision’ under article 127, by the ECB unless there is unanimous consent by
the Council of Ministers.70 This raises important issues regarding the scope of the
ESCB’s oversight of the EU clearing system and whether its oversight of the clearing
and payment systems overlaps with Member States’ prudential supervision of CCPs.
Generally, however, it would appear that the ESCB would have a strong claim as a
legal matter to be involved in the oversight of the clearing system.71
6 Conclusion
The recent crisis demonstrates how systemic risk in liberalised financial markets cre-
ates significant risks for supervisors and policymakers in seeking to protect their eco-
nomic and financial systems from the fallout of financial failure. European financial
markets are increasingly integrated in terms of cross-border operations of institu-
tions and wholesale capital markets and system infrastructure. Prior to and during
the crisis, EU financial supervision had failed to link micro-prudential supervision
with macro-prudential oversight of the financial system. Based on these regulatory
and supervisory weaknesses, the De Larosière Report (2009) supported the creation
of an EU macro-prudential regulatory regime that directly links the micro-prudential
supervision of individual firms and persons with the macro-prudential oversight of
the EU and global financial system. The creation of the ESFS/ESAs and ESRB has
dramatically consolidated institutional oversight of EU financial markets at the EU
level.
The Regulations, however, though institutionally complex, essentially maintain
Member State competence to supervise financial markets, but require supervisors to
coordinate their actions with respect to cross-border firms and incorporate systemic
risk concerns into their supervisory practices. The ESAs and ESRB appear to pro-
vide a robust institutional framework for macro-prudential supervision that is durably
linked to Member State micro-prudential supervision. However, simply creating new
EU institutions is not enough. EU policy makers should also be concerned with the
substantive requirements of financial legislation and whether or not they contribute to
moral hazard in financial markets by creating incentives for market participants to en-
gage in excessive and socially costly risk-taking. Another important area that should
be given more recognition in supervisory strategies is that crisis prevention—through
70Art 127 (6) TFEU provides in relevant part: ‘the Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from
the Commission and after consulting the ECB and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament,
confer upon the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions.’
71Accordingly, the Commission may want to consider appropriate amendments to EMIR to recognise the
ESCB’s role in this area.
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prudential supervision—and crisis management—mitigating a crisis by resolution—
are part of a seamless process. This means effective prudential supervision also re-
quires effective crisis management mechanisms, which include resolution procedures
for banks and other systemically important firms, policies regarding too big to fail
banks, and deposit insurance. Indeed, the ESAs are not authorised to engage in crisis
management and would have no authority to use public funds to resolve bank failures
or some other systemic problem involving a financial institution. Therefore, their ulti-
mate effectiveness can be called into question. Is it really realistic to create EU bodies
with ex ante responsibilities for micro and macro supervision while not having the
authority to bail out, nationalise, or unwind a large bank or to engage in other fi-
nancial rescues? The link between crisis prevention and crisis management therefore
should be high on the EU policy agenda and without a better balance between the
two at the EU level the new Regulations creating the ESFS will fail to achieve their
overall objective of controlling systemic risk.
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